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The Limited Agency and Life-cycles of Personalised Dominant Parties in the post-
Soviet space: the cases of United Russia and Nur Otan 
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Vladimir Putin’s United Russia and Nursultan Nazabayev’s Nur Otan represent a distinctive 
type of dominant party due to their personalist nature and dependence on their presidential 
patrons. Such personalism deprives these parties of the agency to perform key roles in 
authoritarian reproduction typically expected of dominant parties, such as resource 
distribution, policy-making and mobilising mass support for the regime. Instead United 
Russia and Nur Otan have contributed to authoritarian consolidation by securing the 
president’s legislative agenda, stabilising elites to ensure their patron’s hold on power and 
assisting in perpetuating a discourse around the national leader. However, because these 
parties lack the agency to reproduce themselves, to entrench their position and to play more 
than a supportive role in regime consolidation the life-span of such personalist dominant 
parties is likely to be significantly shorter than that of dominant parties.  
Keywords: political parties; authoritarianism; personalism; dominant parties; Russia; 
Kazakhstan 
In the post-Soviet political space regime-centred political parties have monopolised 
legislative and electoral arenas.1 These parties represent the interests of ruling elites, typically
the president, and are characterised by shallow organisational structures and weak societal 
linkages.2 The literature suggests that dominant parties in authoritarian regimes act to support
autocratic rule by distributing resources and benefits among opposition elites and the wider 
public to build support for the regime.3 Moreover, their dominant position in the legislature
enables them to offer policy concessions to co-opt potential rivals into the regime through 
power-sharing deals.4 The cases of Vladimir Putin’s United Russia and president of
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s, Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland),5 suggest dominant
parties in the post-Soviet space do not possess the resource distribution or policy-making 
powers prized by authoritarian rulers elsewhere and lack the agency to perform such 
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functions. Instead in Russia and Kazakhstan these competencies lay outside the control of 
dominant parties and inside the purview of the state and key state actors. If dominant parties 
in Russia and Kazakhstan are not endowed with the agency to perform the archetypal duties 
typified by the experience of dominant parties in other authoritarian states, what functions do 
they serve their respective autocratic patrons and what is their contribution to authoritarian 
consolidation and reproduction? To explore this issue the article addresses three questions: 1) 
how can we best conceptualise dominant parties in the post-Soviet space and what 
distinguishes them from dominant parties in authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world? 
2) What purposes do these parties serve their political masters and to what extent do they 
contribute towards authoritarian consolidation? 3) And to what extent do they contribute to 
authoritarian reproduction in the long-term? 
 
These questions are addressed by pursuing a qualitative, multi-method approach to data 
collection incorporating a review of the existing literature, official publications, surveys of 
local media sources 2005-11 plus elite interviews in Moscow, Almaty and Astana. 29 In-
depth interviews with a range of experts were conducted during July-October 2011 and the 
authors also drew on their rich data set of over 80 interviews with parliamentarians, activists 
and analysts undertaken in 2006-7 for related projects.6 All data was triangulated with at least 
one other source to ensure internal validity.  
 
We argue United Russia and Nur Otan are personalised forms of dominant parties 
distinguishable from typical dominant parties such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) in Mexico, the United Malaysia National Organisation (UNMO) and the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) in Singapore, due to their reduced agency.  United Russia and Nur Otan 
are not the channels through which resources and benefits are distributed, and neither do they 
possess powers of policy making. Instead they were established to bolster the consolidation 
of Putin and Nazarbayev’s power. While they have no policy-making role, these parties did 
support authoritarian consolidation by serving as imprimaturs for presidential policy in the 
legislature.7 While they lack powers of resource distribution, they have aided regime 
consolidation by minimising elite conflict and strengthening elite support. Furthermore, while 
the parties have a limited role in electoral mobilisation, they have promoted a discourse 
concerning the centrality of their respective leaders to the stability and prosperity of the 
nation. By these functions United Russia and Nur Otan have contributed towards 
authoritarian consolidation. 
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While scholars are broadly in agreement that Kazakhstan is authoritarian8, controversy 
remains over the regime categorisation of Russia, with some arguing for a hybrid definition9 
though many scholars now categorise Russia as authoritarian.10 Indeed Russia has had the 
same Freedom House designation of ‘Not Free’ and the same political rights (6) and civil 
liberties (5) scores as Kazakhstan since 2005. Moreover, both states fit Linz’s definition of 
‘political systems with limited [...] political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding 
ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive mobilisation [...] and in which a 
leader [...] exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable 
ones’.11 While we suggest United Russia and Nur Otan have provided support in 
consolidating authoritarian rule in Russia and Kazakhstan, their lack of agency, primarily 
explained by their umbilical ties to Putin and Nazarbayev, undermines their ability to 
contribute to authoritarian reproduction in the long-term. The unravelling and declining 
popularity of United Russia during the 2011-12 electoral cycle is evidence of this. The case 
of Nur Otan is slightly different. Due to the harder variant of authoritarianism in Kazakhstan, 
coupled with its unitary system, and the overwhelming extent to which President Nazarbayev 
has extinguished any political space for opposition, his control of the political system, and 
thus Nur Otan’s monopolisation of the electoral and legislative space, will remain 
unchallenged while he remains in power. However, the party’s lack of autonomy will 
undermine its ability to aid authoritarian durability in a post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan. These 
parties’ lack of agency, due to their overt personalism, distinguishes them from archetypal 
dominant parties and shortens their life-cycle by limiting their contribution to the 
reproduction of the regime. 
 
This article is broken into five sections. First we conceptually evaluate United Russia and 
Nur Otan as ‘dominant’ parties. The three sections which follow then explore how United 
Russia and Nur Otan fall short in the functions typically expected of dominant parties. 
However, in each section we argue the parties perform other functions which served to 
consolidate authoritarian rule. The final section explores more explicitly the differences 
between the two parties and how their lack of agency and regime dynamics impacts on their 
ability to reproduce authoritarianism and how this influences their prospects for survival.  
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Dominant, Hegemonic or Personalist? Ruling Parties in post-Soviet Authoritarian 
Regimes 
 
Dominant parties promote the survival of non-democratic regimes by encouraging power 
sharing and cooperation among ruling elites in an effort to deter rebellion.12 Indeed, analysis 
has shown that non-democratic regimes which feature dominant parties have proven the most 
durable form of authoritarian rule.13 Therefore, the functions dominant parties serve are 
evidently important given they are linked to authoritarian durability. Yet, scholars are 
working from the assumption that dominant parties possess independent agency in order to 
affect causality in supporting regime survival. For example, Magaloni and Kricheli propose 
two broad roles parties perform in non-democratic regimes: ‘a bargaining function, whereby 
the dictator uses the party to bargain with the elites and minimise potential threats to their 
stability; and a mobilizing function, whereby dictators use the party machine to mobilize 
mass support’.14 Therefore, dominant parties are assumed to have agency through allocating 
rents, economic transfers, resources and positions to potential challengers, and the wider 
public (for the purposes of mass mobilisation). The subsequent hope is that in performing 
these roles the party engenders regime loyalty and stability.15 Similarly, dominant parties are 
assumed to affect regime stability  by being the channel in which intertemporal power sharing 
deals can take place by offering outsiders, oppositional elites and potential challengers 
limited control over policy.16 To perform these roles successfully a party needs to maximise 
its monopoly of state resources and it is the politicisation of public resources through a party 
which sustains not just the authoritarian regime but also the party’s preeminent position.17 
Yet, to be able to offer policy concessions to potential rival elites, dominant party elites have 
to be actively involved in making policy. Similarly, in order to distribute jobs, resources and 
rents in an effort to establish credible power-sharing between rival elites, the party has to be 
in possession and control of jobs, resources and rents. United Russia and Nur Otan do not 
possess the agency to construct policy and distribute resources, and this brings into question 
the extent to which we can consider them dominant parties as typically understood in the 
literature.  
 
Some scholars have been moved to suggest United Russia is an archetypal dominant party. 
Reuter, for example, argues that it ‘is increasingly being used as a channel for elite 
recruitment, a forum for distributing rents and a tool for managing elite conflict’.18 However, 
other scholars while acknowledging United Russia’s and Nur Otan’s electoral dominance 
5 
 
point to their lack of influence over personnel and policy and reject their classification as a 
dominant party.19 Gel’man and Remington, while describing United Russia as a dominant 
party, have both preferred to develop their own conceptualisations.20 For instance Gel’man 
defines a dominant party as:  
 
a party that is established by and closely tied to the rulers of an authoritarian regime; 
freely employing state power and resources to maintain its dominance, and uses extra-
constitutional means to control the outcomes of elections and beyond.21  
 
Gelman’s definition suggests the dominant party in Russia takes on a more instrumental form 
as it is ‘nothing more than the agent of its principals’.22  Such a conceptualisation takes 
account of the party’s lack of agency and also shares similarities with Sartori’s classic 
definition of a hegemonic party:  
 
A hegemonic party neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. 
Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are 
not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an 
equal basis. Not only does alternation not occur in fact; it cannot occur, since the 
possibility of a rotation in power is not envisaged.23 
 
Sartori’s definition captures the formal institutional context of the Russian and Kazakh 
political systems. In both cases there is limited multi-partism as other parties are allowed to 
compete, and legally there is a competition for power. Roberts adapts the concept to 
emphasise the party’s lack of agency, referring to United Russia as a ‘virtual’ hegemonic 
party.24  However, what is not fully captured in any definition of the dominant or hegemonic 
party in relation to United Russia and Nur Otan is the personalised nature of these parties. 
Both represent a form of personalised dominant party. They are parties which are inextricably 
tied to the personalist leadership of the country. They possess no autonomy in policy-making 
from their patron and are established by either elites close to the leader or the leader 
themselves as an organisation to support their leadership in key national and regional 
institutions (national legislature, regional government etc.). They have no ideology or 
programme separate from the personalist leader and while they operate in a multi-party 
context, elections are not genuinely competitive.  
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The Russian and Kazakh party systems have been shaped ‘from above’ and both regimes 
invested in building a personalised dominant party in the 2000s that could assist with 
controlling the political sphere. Both regimes used formal means like electoral legislation and 
the laws ‘on political parties’ plus informal practices (‘political technologies’, selective 
prosecutions) to diminish the competitiveness of elections and maximise the parties’ 
dominance.25 In this sense, Kazakhstan and Russia embody a personalist form of 
authoritarianism.26   
 
It is precisely this personalist form of authoritarianism found in Russia and Kazakhstan which 
defines both United Russia and Nur Otan’s lack of agency and which distinguishes them from 
typical dominant parties. While recognising that agency is a contested concept, here it is 
understood as the ability of an individual, institution, or organisation, to act with a degree of 
freedom and without constraint to reproduce or shape wider social processes and structures.27 
In the case of dominant parties, agency is presumed to exist where parties are able to shape 
policy or distribute resources among competing elite groups thus contributing towards 
moulding the political environment, particularly regime stability. For instance, a typical 
dominant party such as the People’s Action Party in Singapore exercises agency by the role it 
plays in supplying social services to the population, while in Malaysia the United Malays 
National Organisation has evinced agency by being the conduit through which resources are 
allocated and policy making occurs.28 Moreover, what is of central importance is that these 
are parties which have a degree of independence from their leaders. Both parties, along with 
many other examples of dominant parties (e.g. PRI in Mexico, ANC in South Africa and the 
Liberal Democratic Party in Japan) have continued to survive and thrive even after their 
founder leaves the political scene. The cases of United Russia and Nur Otan are different. 
They do not possess the independent agency to allocate resources or devise policy. They are 
inextricably bound to their respective leaders and possess no separate identity; they are 
essentially the personal instrument of the leader. This is what marks them out as distinct from 
typical dominant parties.  
The parties’ lack of agency goes some way to explaining their limitations in relation to policy 
making, resource distribution and mass mobilisation. However, as we discuss below, they 
have performed important roles in relation to consolidating the authoritarian rule of Putin and 
Nazarbayev through acting as legislative imprimaturs for presidential policy, as opposed to 
policy making, by marginalising alternative powerful independent actors and offering elite 
stability, as opposed to resource distribution, and by engendering a discourse regarding the 
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centrality of the leader to the nation as opposed to mass mobilisation. However, their lack of 
autonomy vis-á-vis their patron is a weakness limiting their capacity to contribute to the 
reproduction of the regime over the long-term.  
 
Legislative imprimaturs 
A key feature of dominant parties in authoritarian regimes is that along with legislatures they 
can play a key role in co-opting potential rivals and interest groups outside the regime 
through offering policy concessions.29  It is almost a truism that United Russia and Nur Otan 
play only a nominal role in policy formation in Russia and Kazakhstan. In Russia the 
parliamentary party faction has been strictly managed by the Presidential Administration, a 
fact openly acknowledged by some United Russia deputies30 and all policy and decisions on 
voting were decided externally.31 This lack of autonomy was best encapsulated by the late 
Communist deputy Viktor Ilyukhin: 
 
[...] they are ordered about from the Kremlin and from the presidential administration, 
I am sorry for them. I am sorry for them – seriously. You understand, I am sorry 
because they don’t decide anything themselves. They decide only one  
thing – to press the button, and this is also on orders. I sometimes say: Take away all 
your buttons and in their place, put one button in the presidential administration – and 
let them vote there.32   
 
For Nur Otan the situation has been similar. Political analyst Sergei Duvanov has argued that 
‘despite its official status as the ruling party, [Nur Otan] does not form the strategy of the 
future, it does not play a role in the choice of government personnel...it is a party which only 
serves the interest of the government’.33 Tellingly, the Mazhilis, and consequently the Nur 
Otan faction, are viewed as ‘not the place where you can engage in serious politics’.34   
 
This sentiment that United Russia and Nur Otan are instruments of the executive to control 
the legislature and legitimate their decisions is scarcely controversial.35 These parties were 
never intended to contribute to policy-making; rather it was to act as foot soldiers in the 
legislature for their respective patrons. Building legislative majorities which are stable and 
cohesive is essential to ensuring a president’s legislative programme is delivered.36 Since 
their initial incarnation in 1999 both parties rapidly achieved a dominant position in national 
and local legislatures and were able to establish legislative majorities.37 During 2003-11 
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United Russia held over a two-thirds majority of seats in the State Duma (37.6% vote in 2003 
and 64.3% in 2007),38 though this fell back to a simple majority (49.3% vote) in December 
2011. The party also held a majority in 81 of 83 regional legislatures by 2010.39 Otan (Nur 
Otan’s predecessor) won 42 out of 77 seats in the 2004 parliamentary elections, while Nur 
Otan won all of the seats in 2007 (88% vote) and 83 of the 98 contestable seats (80.1% vote) 
in the 2012 parliamentary elections as well as holding 88 per cent of seats in regional 
legislatures.40 Therefore both parties’ penetration into the legislative branch was extensive 
and comprehensive, and was facilitated considerably by a restrictive political environment 
which favoured the presidential parties. 41  
 
The establishment of cast-iron partisan power in both the Duma and Mazhilis has expedited 
the smooth passage of Putin and Nazarbayev’s legislative agendas. In the case of Russia, the 
discipline and voting cohesion of pro-presidential majorities in the Duma increased 
significantly with the advent and domination of the legislature by United Russia in stark 
contrast to the Yeltsin era when relations between the executive and pro-presidential factions 
in the Duma were often strained.42 United Russia had certain privileges to facilitate the 
smooth adoption of laws, such as representation on the government’s influential commission 
on legislative activity43 and the so-called ‘zero reading’ where the budget and significant bills 
were considered prior to their formal introduction into the parliament. So debate moved out 
of the legislature to government territory and to behind closed doors,44 and the adoption of 
legislation accelerated. Where United Russia was publically seen extracting policy 
concessions from the government, this was agreed with the government in advance.45 
 
Similarly, with the establishment of Otan in 1999 and then Nur Otan in 2006 Nazarbayev was 
able to avoid the fractious relationship that had existed between the executive and the 
legislature from 1990-95.46 By providing a compliant legislative majority, if not complete 
monopoly, Nur Otan has aided Nazarbayev in avoiding the intense institutional competition 
of the early years of his presidency.47  Since Otan’s inception, the president’s legislative 
agenda faced ever dwindling opposition: 7 opposition deputies in 1995; 5 deputies in 1999; 1 
in 2004 and 0 in 2007.48 By taking all the seats in the 2007 election Nur Otan controlled all 
organs and committees within the Mazhilis. Even with Ak Zhol (Bright Path) and the 
Communist Peoples Party of Kazakhstan (KPNK) entering parliament in 2012 (with 8 and 7 
deputies respectively), which in any case are considered pro-presidential, Nur Otan continues 
to possess a majority on legislative committees, and retains control over the legislative 
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agenda.49 Since Nur Otan was formed in December 2006, there has been no case where the 
party refused to pass legislation passed down from the presidential administration. Therefore, 
the role of United Russia and Nur Otan has been to consolidate the rule of the regime by 
providing a cohesive partisan majority in the legislature to secure passage of policies drawn 
up by the presidential administration.  
 
Stabilising Elites  
To maintain the regime Putin and Nazarbayev needed to marginalise prospective challengers 
to facilitate greater elite stability and cohesion. Such challengers, either individually or in 
larger factional groups, either held representation in the Duma or Mazhilis through a proxy 
party, possessed significant economic and political resources which represented a challenge 
to the authority of the head of state, or had an independent local power base which provided 
them with autonomy vis-á-vis the centre. Dominant parties in authoritarian regimes are 
usually able to stabilise elite support for the regime through their access to patronage and 
resources and via their ability to lock potentially conflicting elites into a positive-sum game 
whereby loyalty to the regime ensures medium-long-term benefits and the ability to accept 
short-term losses.50  
 
Control of Resources 
For United Russia and Nur Otan, control over resources has remained in the hands of the 
regime and the state bureaucracy, but this has overlapped with both parties. The most notable 
example of this synthesis between state and party was the introduction of legislation 
permitting state officials to join political parties for the first time in 2005 (Russia) and 2007 
(Kazakhstan). Unsurprisingly many governors joined United Russia, although federal 
executive personnel including Putin himself remained formally outside the party. In 
Kazakhstan, governors, ministers and bureaucrats joined Nur Otan en masse, eager to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the president.51 Even though prominent state employees moved 
to join both parties, unlike during Soviet times the state is not subordinate to the party, 
instead the party remains subordinate to the state. In the regions, governors remained in 
control of channelling resources, not the party.  
 
In Russia, governors were largely non-party until the mid-2000s when they joined United 
Russia.52 After 2009, the introduction of party-based nominations for governors ensured a 
formal link, but one that remained largely symbolic. Governors controlled the main patronage 
10 
 
network in their region, even though during Putin’s presidency their autonomy was curtailed 
significantly, so for example, governors had the say over key appointments in regional 
executives.53 Beyond governors, the party had clear ambitions to perform a greater role in 
nominating their candidates for key posts. However, the creation of a United Russia ‘cadre 
reserve’ in 2008 was duplicated by a presidential ‘cadre reserve’ in 2009 which spoke 
volumes about the extent to which the regime saw this as an important role for the party. 
Bader and Roberts argue that neither the cadre reserve, nor the party’s youth organisations 
have served to act as a springboard to senior office in Russia,54 illustrating the party’s 
limitations in regime reproduction.  
 
In Kazakhstan the 2007 constitutional amendment allowing state officials to become 
members of political parties muddied the waters between the state and the party as governors 
moved from de-facto to actual heads of Nur Otan party branches. Jobs and resources, 
however, remained in the hands of governors and associated state bodies, not the party. 
Public employees, like teachers and doctors, rely on the local administration for their 
positions and often the ability to obtain a position within the public sector is dependent upon, 
either voluntarily or without knowledge, adopting membership of Nur Otan.55 While Nur 
Otan may benefit from this process in terms of membership, what is key is that governors are 
able to command the process of job and resource distribution because of their position within 
the bureaucracy not the party.56 
 
Integrating Elites 
Despite their limited ability to distribute patronage and resources United Russia and Nur Otan 
were established as part of a process which was intended to neutralise and integrate powerful 
independent forces who were prospective challengers to their regimes. The first incarnations 
of these parties, Unity and Otan, were both highly contingent responses to elite fragmentation 
and the formation of opposition parties in 1999 engaged in positioning for forthcoming 
presidential (Russia) and parliamentary (Kazakhstan) elections.57 Nur Otan and United 
Russia were both formed by mergers with potential challengers while rule changes, such as 
the permitting of state employees to join political parties, incentivised the incorporation of 
governors, state officials and state employees into the parties. This allowed the parties to 
integrate a broad spread of elites into the regime both negatively (preventing challenges to the 
regime) and positively (being able to mobilise extensive administrative resources at election 
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time). However, the Russian case illustrated the limits of this integrative role as over time 
conflicting regional interests resurfaced within the party. 
 
Initially Otan emerged to counter a powerful independent opposition candidate for president, 
former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin. While the presidential administration had 
successfully marginalised Kazehegeldin’s 1999 presidential bid by a concerted campaign to 
discredit him,58 his party, the Republic Peoples Party of Kazakhstan (RPNK) was set to 
participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Otan was established to neutralise this threat 
by merging a number of pre-existing pro-presidential parties.59 The party marginalised the 
RPNK’s election bid and stamped out any hopes that Kazhegeldin could feasibly oust 
Nazarbayev in the future: in the 1999 parliamentary elections Otan were the largest party in 
the Mazhilis obtaining 24 seats out of 77 (31 per cent). RPNK achieved just one seat. 
 
However competition continued to exist between pro-regime groups and this competition, 
played itself out at the formal rational-legal level in party competition until 2006 when Nur 
Otan was established. In particular, two of the most influential factional elite groups, the 
Dariga Nazarbayeva and Rakhat Aliev group (the president’s daughter and ex-son-in-law) 
and the group based around the interests of the Eurasian National Resources Corporation 
(ENRC) had relatively successful pro-regime parties, Asar (Together) and the Civil Party of 
Kazakhstan (GPK) respectively. 60 Nur Otan, therefore, was created with the specific function 
of uniting these parties allowing Nazarbayev to assert control over fragmented elites. 
According to one opposition member, the ‘merging of the parties [Asar and GPK] with Otan 
was just about the minimisation of independent players ... to minimise the channels and 
resources of their political influence’.61 A journalist writing at the time echoed this sentiment 
suggesting that ‘among "the barons" surrounding Nazarbayev, the oldest daughter and son-in-
law were the most visible, strong and independent. In conditions when the consolidation of 
the elite around the president became vital business, Nursultan Nazarbyaev could simply not 
concede a millimetre.’62 Nur Otan, therefore, was established to united these independent 
players under Nazarbayev’s wing.  
 
Since Nur Otan’s official conception at Otan’s extraordinary conference in December 2006, 
there has been no evidence to suggest the party is acting as an institutional container for these 
competing interests. Rather, in the cases of Aliev, Nazarbayeva and the ENRC their political 
influence has declined significantly since the merger of their parties into Nur Otan. Both 
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Aliev and Nazarbayeva found themselves marginalised and divorced from many of the 
financial and media assets.63 Since the merger of the GPK into Nur Otan in 2006, analysts 
suggest their leaders have ‘lost interest in politics’ and their business has also been scaled 
back.64 What this illustrates is that the party mergers were not an effort to institutionalise 
competing elite interests and potential challengers, but simply an attempt to centralise elite 
support for the president.  
 
Similar to Otan, Unity was conceived as a last minute ‘presidential election tactic’65in 1999 
to counter a threat to the regime in the form of Fatherland All-Russia (FAR), a conglomerate 
of powerful regional figures seeking Duma representation as a launch pad for their 
presidential candidate, Yevgenii Primakov. Unity’s impressive 23.3% compared to FAR’s 
13.3% in December 1999 helped ensure that by the time of the presidential election in March 
2000 FAR’s heavyweights had thrown their weight behind Putin.66 In late 2001 Unity 
absorbed FAR to form United Russia, making FAR leaders like Yuriy Luzhkov and Mintimer 
Shaimiev co-Chairs of the party’s Higher Council. Thus strong autonomous regional actors 
were integrated into the regime by the party, permitting the Kremlin to tap their local power 
bases and electoral machines, but the joins were not always seamless. Luzhkov for instance 
retained considerable personal power, heading the so-called ‘Moscow group’, and tensions 
with Putin remained,67 but crucially at the same time he remained outwardly supportive of the 
regime, delivering United Russia victories in Moscow for a decade.  
 
United Russia’s lack of agency hindered its ability to effectively integrate elites and to 
mediate conflict between them where politico-economic interests clashed. In Russia the 
political landscape was complicated by the federal structure and the variegated experiences of 
pluralism and regional autonomy, making the building and maintaining of any national party 
challenging.68 This diversity was acknowledged in the Kremlin’s experiment with an 
alternative pro-presidential party, Just Russia, which inter alia intended to maximise support 
for Putin from left-leaning voters and thus take votes from the Communists.69 However, this 
party started to take votes from United Russia and Kremlin support was withdrawn as the 
regime began to focus all efforts on ‘operation successor’ during 2007-8.  
 
Once Putin had decided to become prime minister in 2008, a 2/3 majority in the State Duma 
was desired to protect him from dismissal and facilitate constitutional changes if required. 
Given the move to a fully proportional electoral system for the 2007 parliamentary elections, 
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this was a very tall order for United Russia. In order to maximise the mobilisation capacity at 
this critical election time considerable efforts were made to recruit local elites including 
mayors from opposition parties and representatives of diverse and competing local business 
groups.70 This rapid, heterogeneous expansion of the party during 2007-8 led to public 
manifestations of internal party conflict in towns and regions where elites were divided. 
Conflict between financial-industrial groups incorporated into the party was endemic in 
Smolensk,71 while multiple United Russia candidates stood against the official party 
candidate in local elections in Nizhnyi Tagil in 2008, and in Smolensk and Murmansk in 
2009.72 Such cases illustrate the inability of the party in less authoritarian regions to lock 
competing elites into a longer-term positive sum game and this was connected to the party’s 
lack of agency and its limitations in distributing spoils beyond posts in local legislatures. 
United Russia’s struggle to contain intra-elite conflict at the local level illustrates that while 
the party was initially successful in consolidating elite support for Putin, its failure to evolve 
into a genuine dominant party served to hinder its ability to reproduce that support over the 
long-term.  
 
Mobilising the Masses 
A central function of dominant parties in the literature is that of mass mobilisation which 
includes ensuring high electoral turnouts and supermajorities in the absence of competitive 
conditions to create an image of invincibility to deter would-be challengers.73 Although such 
concerns were evident in Russia and Kazakhstan, our cases are distinctive due to the parties’ 
lack of agency in the electoral process. Ultimately, personalism provides the clearest 
explanation for the parties’ election successes, because the resources to reward supporters 
and sanction opponents remained largely external to both parties. These parties are dependent 
upon, above all, the personal popularity of the president or national leader as well as other 
notables at regional level for their electoral support. In other words, it is not so much that the 
party mobilises support for the leader, but the other way around: the party harvests the 
national leader’s popularity at parliamentary and regional elections, underpinned by those of 
regional leaders, a skewed electoral playing field, administrative resources, media control 
and, to some extent, fraud. However, if one or more of these buttresses of exogenous party 
support are undermined, in particular the personalistic elements, then the party can struggle to 
maintain its position in the political system, as occurred in Russia during 2011. Nevertheless, 
simultaneously personalist dominant parties can contribute to promoting a narrative on the 
indispensability and inevitability of the leadership and thus assist in consolidating his/her 
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relationship with wider society. Although this has been pursued more extensively and 
successfully in Kazakhstan, this function was also detectable for United Russia especially as 
Putin was faced with leaving the presidency in 2008.  
 
Electoral Mobilisation 
Both Nur Otan and United Russia were formed as party extensions of the president and this 
proximity to the national leader was their main source of success. For example, party 
programmes are in essence regurgitations of the platforms and policies of their respective 
leaders. Nur Otan’s 2007 manifesto74 was derived from the president’s speech given earlier 
that year to parliament, while United Russia’s 2008 manifesto was tellingly entitled ‘Putin’s 
plan’.75 The president’s projection of his personal power and popularity onto the party was its 
greatest electoral asset.76 Poll data from October 2007 by the Levada Centre found that 39% 
of those intending to vote for United Russia declared their support was primarily because it 
‘Putin’s party’.77 Furthermore, Putin’s decision to head the electoral list in 2007 led to an 
immediate surge in party poll ratings.78  
 
However, while Nazabayev’s relationship with Nur Otan has always been rather 
straightforward - he holds party card no.1, leads the party and most government officials are 
members of the party - Putin’s attitude to United Russia has always been more complex. 
Putin did not join the party and was sometimes even publically critical of it,79 although during 
the 2008 succession he drew closer to it, heading the 2007 party list first of all to ensure the 
required 2/3 Duma majority, but also as a source of popular legitimacy while occupying the 
Prime Minister’s post. This helps explain why he chose to become the leader of the party in 
March 2008, as an additional institutional support to his position. However, Putin still did not 
join the party formally and later sought to distance himself from it, particularly after the 
party’s rating fell in 2011. In May 2011, Putin formed the All-Russian Popular Front in an 
attempt to broaden his support base for the presidential elections but it was also an attempt to 
bring fresh blood into United Russia. Although Putin campaigned hard for the party in 201180 
indicating that a good result was perceived as essential to his smooth return to the Kremlin in 
2012, following the disappointing result of less than 50% vote, all references to the party 
were dropped from the presidential campaign.81   
 
The personalist nature of the parties extended beyond their electoral dependence on Putin and 
Nazarbayev down to the sub-national level, where politics was also extremely personalised.82 
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Governors comprised the second key pillar in the parties’ success because they controlled the 
resources that could be deployed to mobilise voters and perpetrate electoral fraud. In both 
states, state employees, who were often encouraged or forced to join the party, were 
mobilised for campaigning. This included a number of means,83 for instance tasking local 
business directors dependent on the local administration for resources or licences to ensure 
their employees voted correctly.84 In Kazakhstan, this mobilisation of state resources was 
extremely effective in delivering high turnouts and preponderant results for Nur Otan creating 
an aura of invincibility and inevitability around Nazarbayev’s leadership.  
 
While some Russian regions were able to deliver uniformity of pro-regime voting85 elsewhere 
the picture was more heterogeneous. The synchronisation of governor’s electoral machines 
with United Russia was partially undermined by the ending of governors’ direct election in 
2004. Some governors’ capacity to utilise electoral machines was reduced because newly-
appointed figures86 sometimes lacked popularity in their regions87 or had failed to establish 
good relations with local elites.88 Thus in some regions, an important buttress of party support 
was undermined in the 2011 elections. As such, it was not United Russia as a party that was 
able to mobilise voters, but rather the party was the beneficiary of the resources that could be 
accessed by state officials who were often party members or at least needed to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the Kremlin to ensure the appropriate flow of budget receipts.   
 
Promoting the ‘National Leader’ 
Although neither party demonstrated agency in the electoral process, there is evidence to 
suggest that a more subtle role was played in promoting a narrative about the indispensability 
of Nazarbayev and Putin. In the case of Nur Otan the party is pivotal to the promotion of a 
discourse regarding the centrality of Nazarbayev’s leadership to the unity, prosperity and 
stability of Kazakhstan.89 This discourse has broadly focused on the president’s success in 
nation-building, ensuring inter-ethnic stability, impressive economic growth and a successful 
foreign policy.90 The party leadership and the party more broadly through campaign literature 
and posters, propagate this message. Perhaps the most notable instance of this was in 2010 
when former Nur Otan First Deputy Chairman, Darkhan Kaletayev proposed the ‘leader of 
the nation’ legislation. This legislation conferred the title of El basy (leader of the nation) and 
formally bestowed on Nazarbayev the power to intervene in the domestic and foreign affairs 
of the state should he leave office as well as giving his family immunity from prosecution. 
Such aggrandising of Nazarbayev is not just an appeal to a form of charismatic leadership of 
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Atatürkian proportions, but is also a common theme put forward by Nur Otan deputies and 
officials.91 Given that there is limited independent media, such fetishising of his leadership 
saturates the state media outlets which most Kazakh citizens consume and consequently 
many have bought into the narrative. A poll conducted in 2010 by the reputable Strategy 
Centre of Social and Political Studies found 89 per cent of respondents were happy with 
Nazarbayev’s performance.92 
 
However, there is a question of the extent to which the discourse can continue to be 
successful in penetrating the public consciousness. The leader of the nation legislation was 
controversial and created disquiet among some of the moderate majority in Kazakhstan.93 
Moreover, the erection of statues and the ubiquitous portraits of Nazarbayev across the 
country points to the stretching out the discourse into a personality cult which may not sit 
entirely comfortably with all citizens in Kazakhstan. Additionally, increasing incidents of 
violence and conflict including a series of suicide bombings in 2011 and long-term oil 
workers strikes have undermined the story of how Nazarbayev has created stability and 
harmony in Kazakhstan. While Nur Otan might be able to assist in the transmission of the 
discourse, the extent to which it can be successful in doing so is dependent upon the 
discourse at least reflecting the reality of people’s everyday experience. Recent events 
suggest there is now an emerging mismatch between the story promoted by Nur Otan and the 
presidential administration and the realities of life for ordinary people. Some members of the 
Nur Otan hierarchy such as party Secretary Yerlan Karin recognise that the party does not 
have a long-term future as Nazarbayev’s ‘propaganda regime’ and needs to evolve and ‘use 
its political power to resolve "real issues”’.94 If the party is to follow Karin’s suggestion it 
needs to become a genuine ruling party where it possess agency separate from its patron.  
 
Putin’s leadership also witnessed a ‘mini cult of personality’.95 It became de rigour to hang 
his portrait in state offices,glorifying poems and artwork proliferated and these fed into the 
broader narrative about Putin bringing stability after the chaos of the 1990s, delivering strong 
statehood and a ‘vertical of power’ to prevent the disintegrative tendencies of the 1990s and 
bringing economic prosperity and national pride after the hardships and humiliations of the 
1990s. In the literature, scholars see the party riding on the coattails of Vladimir Putin and 
dependent on his personal popularity and endorsements for its electoral success.96 Therefore, 
party statements about and support for Putin must be understood primarily as attempts to fix 
the close connection between the party and Putin in voters’ minds at election time.97 
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Nevertheless, United Russia did play a secondary role in supporting Putin as president, 
affirming the correctness of his policies and his exceptional personal qualities to bring 
stability and create a strong Russian state.98 Furthermore, from 2007 with Putin’s anticipated 
departure from the presidency, the function of creating a narrative around Putin that could 
help ensure his political future became tangible. Party literature for the 2007 election 
campaign referred to him as the ‘national leader’99 and in November 2007 the party even 
floated the idea of forming a ‘Citizens’ Synod of the Russian Nation’, that would appoint a 
‘national leader’ with special status and powers, who of course would be Vladimir Putin.100 
Some sources suggested that this trial balloon was released after consultations with deputy 
head of the presidential administration Vladislav Surkov, and indicated that the regime was 
toying with a para-constitutional position for Putin from 2008. The idea got considerable 
press and helped to fix the idea of Putin as national leader in the popular mind, buttressed by 
appropriate statements from the party’s leadership.101 Embedding the term ‘national leader’ in 
political discourse was important while Putin did not occupy the role of head of state and the 
executive. The term suggested a role above politics, integrative, representative of the entire 
population and of a timeless, unique nature i.e. a position not subject to presidential terms. It 
acknowledged his continuing influence in Russian politics in 2008-12, and kept open the 
option of returning to the presidency. The party helped to forge a widely utilised discourse 
around Putin personally that supported his continued significance in Russian politics. Putin 
could not do this by himself, party support was needed and in this instance rather successful, 
even if the broader discourse itself, as with discourse regarding Nazarbayev, was increasingly 
challenged from 2011.  
 
Conclusion: The Life-Cycles of Personalist Dominant Parties  
While Nur Otan dominated all facets of public politics and subsumed elite conflicts, United 
Russia increasingly struggled to manage regional elite disputes and from 2011, experienced 
greater difficulty in maintaining electoral dominance in less authoritarian regions.102 This 
divergence in the efficacy of the parties can be explained to a large extent by the nature of the 
regimes. Although we have argued that both Russia and Kazakhstan are authoritarian in the 
Linzian sense, and of a personalist variant, there are important differences. Kazakhstan’s 
variant of authoritarianism is ‘harder’, longer-established and less ambiguous. The flowering 
of pluralism permitted by glasnost and perestroika was more limited in the Central Asia 
republics than in Russia and although elite turnover following the collapse of the USSR was 
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limited in Russia, it was almost non-existent in Kazakhstan.103 Nazarbayev has been president 
since 1990 and has marginalised all opponents and restricted the political space for dissent. 
Crucially he was able to bring governors to heel in the mid-1990s by appointing national 
elites to these posts104 whereas Russia’s federal structure combined with state weakness in the 
1990s permitted the emergence of regional strongmen who could challenge and win 
concessions from the centre. Putin’s attempts to create a ‘power vertical’ facilitating the 
imposition of central power over the regions was only partially successful105 and the 
presidential appointment of governors proved a double-edged sword for a United Russia 
partly dependent upon governors’ electoral machines. So Russia exhibited a greater plurality 
of interests along regional and national lines. The softer variant of authoritarianism 
maintained under Putin also generated the 2008 ‘succession crisis’. While Nazarbayev had 
the constitution altered in 2007 to allow him unlimited presidential terms, Putin stressed 
adherence to the 1993 constitution, necessitating him stepping aside for a term. The regime’s 
subordination of all political aims to facilitating a smooth succession shaped the trajectory of 
development for United Russia and imbued it with tensions, at once elevating the party as 
Putin’s ‘insurance policy’ yet generating an urgent need to maximise the vote beyond what 
might have been considered realistic and so increasing the party’s heterogeneity by its 
absorption of municipal officials from other parties.  
 
Alongside distinctions in regime dynamics, the attitude of the national leader to his progeny 
was the second reason why Nur Otan was better able to maintain a dominant electoral 
position and stabilise elites. We have argued that Nazarbayev maintained a very close 
relationship with Nur Otan and this means that any attack on the party was perceived as an 
attack on the national leader, the architect of Kazakhstan’s independent statehood. This 
personalist connection helps explain why Nur Otan has not faced challenges to its electoral 
position and is able to incorporate the highest echelons of national and regional elites with 
few visible tensions. However, this does not mean that the party will be able to contribute to 
authoritarian reproduction in the long-term as the intensely personalist nature of the party, 
and its lack of agency, means that once Nazarbayev leaves the political stage (he is 72 years 
old) the future of the party is highly contingent on the attitude of his successor as well as their 
position, who will not be as exalted as El basy or may wish to disassociate themselves to a 
greater or lesser extent from his personal party. On the other hand, Putin’s attitude to United 
Russia was always more equivocal and this impeded the party’s ability to integrate elites. For 
instance, Putin’s ambivalence meant that many key federal elites did not see the necessity of 
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joining the party. In turn, the party’s lack of agency limited its ability to contribute to 
authoritarian reproduction in the longer term and this was compounded by its subordination 
to Putin’s short term electoral requirements. Putin’s formation of the All-Russian Popular 
Front and his decision not to head the party’s 2011 electoral list underscored the sense that he 
regarded the party as potentially damaging to his presidential chances in 2012. In this light, 
Putin’s relinquishing of the party chair to Medvedev in May 2012 amid rumours about a 
possible rebranding or restructuring106 can be interpreted inter alia as the regime’s 
recognition of the project’s failings and its uncertainty about United Russia’s future role. 
 
Our two case studies suggest the life-span of personalist dominant parties is likely to be 
significantly shorter than that of dominant parties, because these personalist dominant parties 
lack the agency to reproduce themselves, to entrench their position and to play more than a 
supportive role in regime consolidation. Whereas prior scholarship points to the important 
and enduring roles dominant parties perform in conjunction with power sharing, cooperation 
and voter mobilisation, which suggests that dominant parties (and other institutions) are more 
than simple ‘window-dressing’,107 the two cases analysed here are different creatures. We 
have pointed to the overtly personalised element of these parties and the extent to which this 
overwhelms their autonomy and ability to perform functions typified by the experience of 
dominant parties elsewhere in the world. The personalist feature of these parties is their 
defining one, that ultimately renders them instruments rather than agents of the regime. As 
such, although they do play identifiable roles in authoritarian consolidation such as securing 
the president’s legislative agenda, stabilising elites to ensure the patron’s position and hold on 
power and assisting in perpetuating a discourse around the national leader, these are 
supportive rather than central to regime survival and the lack of agency limits their ability to 
lock elites into a long-term positive sum game and hence their own life expectancy. As such, 
United Russia and Nur Otan are dominant, but they do not truly have the agency to dominate, 
the power of domination remains with the president, regional governors and state 
bureaucracy. While there have been parties in the past who have survived excessive 
personalisation to go on and have enduring life spans, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Republican 
People’s Party of Turkey is one example, in these instances such parties have a clear 
ideological remit and were forged in the fires of nation and state formation amid an 
atmosphere of genuine political competition. This is not the case with United Russia and Nur 
Otan who have emerged post hoc nation and state formation in the decade following the 
upheaval of Soviet collapse. Therefore, further research is needed to consider the explicit 
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conceptual parameters of personalist dominant parties and the extent to which they are an 
exclusively post-Soviet anomaly or a broader global phenomenon illustrative of the changing 
roles and functions of political parties and formal institutions in authoritarian regimes.  
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